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0. Introduction
This paper aims to examine the cognitive approaches to understanding two 
aspects of language change: semantic change (including semantic narrowing 
and broadening) and analogy, and the ways in which contextualization during 
discourse contributes to the emergence of new meanings. The whole investigation 
is embedded in the framework of cognitive linguistics, in which framework the 
cognitive processes behind the emergence of new meanings are discussed. The 
paper is structured in the following way: first, the nature of semantic change and 
analogical change itself will be described, after which the various cognitive and 
mental processes (such as conceptual metaphors, embodiment, metonymy, etc.) 
are detailed, which is followed by an account of the possible role contextualization 
plays when new meanings are brought about. As a synthesis of semantic change, 
its cognitive aspects and the role of contextualization, the paper concludes with 
a synchronic outlook and a survey of changes observable in certain present-day 
languages, exemplified by cases taken from English and Hungarian.
1. The Nature of Semantic Change and Analogy
The workings of semantic change and analogy have long been under the scrutiny 
of linguists, with one of the earliest typologies being that of Bréal (1897/1900) who 
classified semantic change into four categories: (I) change from general to specific 
meaning (restriction of meaning), (II) change from specific to general meaning 
(expansion of meaning), (III) metaphor and (IV) change from abstract to concrete 
meaning (concretion of meaning) (Bréal 1897: 119–153/1900: 106–138). The first 
general and comprehensive treatise of analogical change was created by Kuryłowicz 
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(1949), who examined the kinds of regularities to be found in this rather haphazard 
phenomenon and which led to the formulation of six ‘laws’ for analogical change, 
which were amended, and in part challenged, by Mańczak (1958) who established 
nine tendencies of analogy. Hock (1991: 210–234) provides a somewhat detailed 
account and explanation of these laws and tendencies for reference, and despite 
the main topic of this current paper being the discussion of analogy and language 
change, for reasons of brevity the above mentioned processes can not be expanded 
on here in detail. Nevertheless, it should be noted that both Kuryłowicz’s laws 
and Mańczak’s tendencies are predominantly concerned with morphology 
and morphological change. Analogy, however, is not confined to the realm of 
morphology and inflectional patterns, because it is a basic cognitive mechanism 
that enables humans to grasp and understand the world through exploiting familiar 
knowledge and perceived similarities (Győri 2002: 137). Anttila (2003: 428–429) 
also describes the “faculty to analogize” as being innate, and being, in its essence, 
a very powerful ability to copy.
The notion of semantic change can be described or interpreted in a number of 
different ways, depending on whether it is understood as a process or as an outcome 
and whether the approach from which it is examined takes the linguistic form 
as constant (the semasiological approach) and focuses on changes in meaning 
associated with a given form, or takes the concepts as constant (the onomasiological 
approach) and focuses on which forms are used for expressing that given concept 
(Traugott 2006b: 124). Concerning the classification of semantic changes, 
a number of subtypes can be established, which are: semantic broadening (or 
generalization), semantic narrowing (or specialization), pejoration and amelioration. 
Semantic broadening occurs when a word that has a specialized meaning is used to 
denote a broader scope of meanings, that is its originally specialized and narrow 
sense is extended or generalized, for example in the case of Modern English bird 
< OE brid1 ‘young bird, nestling’ the originally restrictive sense of young bird 
was broadened and became inclusive for every kind of birds. Semantic narrowing 
is a phenomenon that is exactly the reverse of semantic broadening, namely that 
a word with an originally broad and inclusive meaning acquires a restricted and 
more specialized sense, for instance ModE meat < OE mete ‘food (in general)’ 
(cf. Swedish mat ‘food’). Pejoration and amelioration work in a similar manner 
as narrowing and broadening, which means that the underlying principle of 
amelioration and pejoration is the same, but they operate in opposite directions. 
1 The Modern English form arose through a metathesis of r and i. Also cf. German Vogel ‘bird’ 
cognate with ModE fowl ‘domesticated bird’ < OE fugol ‘bird’ which constitutes a case of semantic 
narrowing.
25Understanding Semantic Change
Pejoration is a process whereby a word that originally has a positive meaning and 
a positive semantic prosody acquires a negative sense and negative connotations, for 
instance ModE silly < OE sǣ lig ‘blessed, happy’ (cf. German selig ‘happy, blessed’, 
Icelandic sæll ‘happy’). Amelioration, on the other hand, happens when a word with 
originally negative connotations is assigned a new, positive meaning, such as ModE 
knight < OE cniht ‘boy, servant’ (cf. Traugott 2006b: 125).
It can safely be assumed that similarity and contiguity, which are also the basic 
motivating forces of metaphor and metonymy, respectively, play a significant role 
in the emergence of semantic change. Those words whose meaning is extended by 
attributing a new meaning on the basis of a real or perceived similarity to other 
notions or entities acquire metaphorical meanings and those words whose meaning 
is extended via the attribution of a new sense that arises from a real and tangible 
association (in most cases a part-whole relationship) acquire a new, metonymical 
meaning. While metaphor and metonymy make use of the similarity and contiguity 
of senses, two other initiators of meaning change are also very much reliant on 
these two relations: folk etymology and ellipsis. These two phenomena are form-
centered rather than sense-centered. Folk etymology arises from a similarity of form 
(phonological, morphological or orthographic) and a contiguity of form brings 
about ellipsis (McMahon 1994: 182–184). Folk taxonomy works along similar lines 
as the phenomena described previously, as can be seen for instance in the case of 
the Jesus lizard, which is a member of the basilisk genus capable of running across 
the water’s surface and is so named because of the perceived similarity between the 
lizard’s capability of running on water and Jesus’ ability to walk on water.
2. The Cognitive Base of Semantic Change
A very basic feature of human cognition is the ability of pattern recognition, 
which patterns may be those of faces, images, sounds or even linguistic signs. This 
recognition of patterns in linguistic signs or construed meanings is important 
for new meanings to emerge, because their emergence is based on the previously 
described copying function of human cognition that arises from its analogous 
nature. The emergence of metaphors and metaphorical meanings is also rooted in 
the analogizing nature of cognition, because they rely on a perceived similarity of 
two entities or concepts, the similarity of which could not be perceived without the 
ability to recognize the shared patterns of the two concepts in question.
The benefit of the above described nature of human cognition is the ability 
to categorize entities and concepts, with the ultimate purpose of “[providing] 
maximum information with the least cognitive effort” (Rosch 1978: 28). This 
categorization occurs on the basis of prototypes (as opposed to the necessary and 
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sufficient features that can be found in each instance of the category, as described 
by the classical view), which are the best representatives of their respective category, 
which means that some instances of categories are less prototypical and therefore 
peripheral. Categories in the prototype theory have fuzzy boundaries, meaning that 
certain categories may overlap to varying extent, due to the fact that less prototypical 
and more peripheral instances of categories can often be subsumed under the 
neighboring category, therefore category membership is subject to gradation 
(cf. Langacker 1987: 369–370). In connection with the prototype theory, Rosch (1978: 
30–35) also describes the basic level abstractions and basic level categories, which are 
those that have the highest cue-validity, and are the most readily perceivable. During 
first language acquisition, children acquire the basic level categories first. Essentially, 
cue-validity refers to how prototypical an instance of a given concept is, by showing 
how valid its features (cues) are for evoking a given category. 
It is the cognitive processes that actuate language change, which will yield the 
linguistic coding of categories, that is, lexicalization. Győri (2002: 143–147) 
describes four factors that are involved in, or even responsible for, the emergence 
of ‘coding expressions’ i.e. those expressions that explicitly mark certain features 
of the conceptual category. These four factors are: cue-validity, cognitive economy, 
perceived world structure and conjunctivity. Győri suggests cue-validity, as it has 
been described in the previous paragraph, as the central factor in the selection of 
coding expressions from among the features. Cognitive economy and perceived 
world structure are related to cue-validity and to the principle of conveying the 
maximum of information with minimal cognitive effort. 
Reddy’s seminal paper about the description of metalanguage in terms of the 
conduit metaphor (Reddy 1979) demonstrated and proved that everyday language 
use is largely metaphorical, and that metaphor is in fact a matter of thought and not 
so much a matter of language. Running contrary to Reddy’s theory is the pragmatic 
approach to metaphor, put forward by Searle (1993), according to which metaphor 
is purely a linguistic phenomenon, and metaphoric or figurative interpretation of 
utterances comes only after examining whether the utterance can be understood 
literally. If it can not, then it must be metaphorical. Therefore, every utterance is 
examined whether its truth conditions are fulfilled, i.e. it is to be taken in the literal 
sense, or they are broken, which means that it is a figurative utterance and is to be 
understood metaphorically. 
Perhaps the two most important figures of speech that are part and parcel of 
semantic change and are ubiquitous in everyday discourse are metaphor and 
metonymy. Metonymy can be seen a ‘precursor’ to metaphor (Koch 1999: 139), 
inasmuch as the conceptual contiguity which is the basis of metonymy can lead to 
an associative leap which constitutes the basis of metaphor, therefore metaphors can 
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emerge from metonyms. As opposed to metonyms, which are based on conceptual 
contiguity, metaphors are brought about by a perceived similarity between two 
concepts or entities. The conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff 1993) holds that 
metaphor is a matter of thought and conceptualization, and is brought about by 
asymmetric and partial mappings across conceptual domains. The conceptual 
domains between which the cross-domain mappings occur are the epistemic 
source domain and the ontological target domain. The epistemic domain contains 
knowledge of everyday things gained from experience, while the ontological 
domain, onto which the source domain is mapped, contains abstractions, emotions 
and abstract notions (cf. e.g. Ibarretxe 1996: 119–120).  Metonyms, on the other 
hand operate in only one conceptual domain and no cross-domain mapping is 
involved, and they can be realized in a variety of forms and can give rise to different 
subtypes, such as synecdoche, which is based on a pars pro toto relationship, but in 
each case, the central notion is that of contiguity.
The emergence of new meanings through metaphors, and the emergence of 
metaphors themselves, very often occurs on an experiential basis. This is because 
human cognition has a tendency to make sense of new phenomena in terms of 
already familiar experience, and to conceptualize abstract notions in terms of 
concrete and tangible concepts, which seems to be in accordance with the general 
direction of semantic change from concrete to abstract. Furthermore, embodiment 
is an indispensable part of human cognition, and it also manifests itself in 
language and conceptual metaphors. Since the very root and origin of human 
conceptualization and meaning is perceptual experience and the human body itself 
and the different movements and manipulations of and by the body (cf. Győri & 
Hegedűs 2012: 322), we tend to build our conceptual metaphors around it, such as 
understanding is grasping, more is up, less is down, etc. 
The underlying cognitive mechanisms of semantic change are not only relevant 
for the understanding of how the meanings of attested words change, but they 
are also relevant for historical comparative reconstruction and the establishment 
of the semantic content of the words of unattested protolanguages. Győri & 
Hegedűs (2012) describe the problems of establishing universal tendencies 
of semantic change and the cross-linguistic applicability of such universal 
tendencies. Furthermore, embedded in a cognitive theoretical framework, they 
argue for the relatedness of the original senses of Modern English knee and 
chin/jaw. Their argument is that these two words in fact derive from the same 
Indo-European etymon, and represent two different ablaut grades of it, with 
their meaning differentiation and semantic extension arising from the perceived 
resemblance of shape and the notion of angle and angularity. 
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Concerning the motivations of semantic change, a number of factors can 
be differentiated (for a cognitive overview see Blank 1999). One such factor, 
undeniably, is the expressive need of the speaker (cf. Blank 1999: 63), and the need 
for clarity. The speakers needs to make themselves understood with as much ease as 
possible, and also in a way that demands the least effort from the hearer’s part for 
understanding and decoding, which seems to be in accordance with the Gricean 
maxim which dictates that the speaker say as much as is necessary and in such 
a way that facilitates understanding. 
3. The Role of Contextualization
Utterances of a discourse are rarely standalone, discrete units of communication 
but much rather active members, and also directors, of the flow of information. 
Utterances are both shapers of and shaped by discourse. In its essence, discourse is 
a negotiation between the mental content and the communicative intentions of the 
speaker and the hearer, which content and intentions are mediated through language. 
This procedure of negotiation is embedded within the context of the discourse, which 
is dynamic and conventional at the same time. It is dynamic, because each turn 
and utterance in a dialogue, monologue and any other form of communication and 
human verbal interaction brings about and activates an ad hoc context in which that 
utterance makes sense and is to be understood, and it is conventional because there 
are rules that govern conversation and turn-taking, for instance the oft-cited Gricean 
maxims of conversation (Grice 1975), and both the hearer and the speaker adheres to 
them2 and expects that every language user also adheres to the rules.
Shared, common background world knowledge that each individual has 
internalized is also utilized during contextualization in order to make sense of 
and interpret the speaker’s utterances. Based on this background world knowledge 
and cultural knowledge, participants of the discourse can bring about implicit 
assumptions, or inferences, regarding the content of the discourse. For successful 
communication it is indispensable for the participants to have knowledge of the 
situational context and the relationship between the hearer and the speaker in the 
speech situation, as well as to have knowledge of how and where are the utterances 
created and understood and what kind of spatial and temporal relationships exist 
between the participants (Tátrai 2004: 480). Contexts of utterances are usually 
2 However, breaking the rules can also be construed as conventional behavior. If one of the 
participants of the conversation flouts one or more of the conversational maxims, either on purpose or 
accidentally, they will, again either deliberately or unwillingly, communicate their intention which will 
enable the other party to infer the speaker’s intended meaning. 
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internally constructed by each participant, which means that for each conversation 
or discourse that their participants engage in, the context is constructed on the 
spot, in an ad-hoc fashion, by taking into consideration the previously mentioned 
relationships and situational context. Warren (1999: 219) distinguishes two types 
of word meaning: out of context dictionary meaning and contextual meaning 
which refers to the value that is added to a word in context.  Finally, semantic 
frames, which contain information regarding specific situations, and are based on 
experience, are also relevant for contextualization, because they introduce a specific 
context in which the utterances are to be understood.
Speech acts, especially indirect speech acts, are strongly linked to context, 
contextualization and intended meanings. Indirect speech acts (such as, for 
instance, the oft-cited utterance “It’s getting hot in here”) are virtually meaningless 
without knowing what kind of context they should be understood in. Users of 
indirect speech acts, in order to achieve their intended perlocutionary effect, need 
to be perfectly aware of the speech situation, the context of the discourse and the 
relationship of the hearer (or hearers) and the speaker. 
Semantic change does not and can not come about in a vacuum, contextualization 
is a necessary precondition and circumstance for new meanings to arise which 
always happens as a result of “context-dependent alteration of usage” (Győri 
2002: 125). Traugott (2006b: 125) also notes that “change results from the use of 
language in context” (ibid.) which context can be cultural or linguistic. This means 
that meanings are rarely, if ever, stable and that they are to be understood as rather 
elusive, yet dynamic and constantly evolving phenomena, with the current meaning 
of a word in any given period in the history of the language deriving from and being 
related to a previous meaning. Also, the different types of semantic change are not in 
conflict with each other and are not mutually exclusive, but rather feed each other. 
While on the subject of the role of contextualization, it can be mentioned that 
Koch (1999: 139–140) distinguishes two, interrelated, types of metonymy: ad hoc 
metonymy and metonymic polysemy. Ad hoc metonymy, as can be inferred from its 
name, is created for the purpose of the currently ongoing conversation or discourse, 
while metonymic polysemy refers to the metonymic relationship of two senses of 
a polysemous word, such as bar ‘counter’ and bar ‘public house’. Furthermore, in his 
discussion, Koch establishes that the lexicalization of polysemous meanings come 
about through the lexicalization of ad hoc usage of words in discourse (ibid.).
Finally, as it has been noted in section two, the understanding of the cognitive 
processes behind semantic change is rather significant for semantic reconstruction, 
yet context and contextualization may also be quite an important aspect to 
be considered. The prevailing and most widely practiced method of semantic 
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reconstruction is that of the abstraction or accumulation of meanings of the 
descendant words found in the Proto-Indo-European daughter languages (cf. Győri 
2005: 199–200). However, this methodology can be challenged by a method that 
thoroughly examines the linguistic and social context in which the reflexes of the 
reconstructed form are used (Clackson 2007: 191–195). This would mean, then, 
that by employing this method, semantic reconstruction would need to take into 
consideration aspects of sociolinguistics and cultural studies which would be rather 
difficult task to carry out in a diachronic investigation. Nevertheless, semantic 
change cannot be separated from context, be it linguistic or cultural. 
4. The Synchronic Perspective
Owing to the fact that languages are constantly evolving, semantic change is also 
a constantly ongoing, ever present phenomenon of natural, human languages, and 
a present-day speaker of any language is most likely to be unaware of just how 
productive and innovative the language that he or she speaks is. However much 
semantic change is a process that is best understood from a diachronic point of view, 
it is nevertheless the synchronic variant (or variants, dialects or even sociolects) 
spoken in any given epoch of the language’s history in which the change itself 
originates. A number of extralinguistic factors also constitute a significant force in 
bringing about semantic change, for instance technological progress, changes in the 
sociocultural environment, foreign rule (which very often leads to contact induced 
language change and the influx of varying amounts of foreign words), language 
policies and conscious effort aimed at rejecting foreign words and borrowings, 
and expressing new concepts through utilizing the morphological inventory of the 
language – with varying degrees of success, we should add. 
Probably the best example of such ‘linguistic purism’ in the present-day variety 
of a language might be the case of Icelandic where deliberate and conscious effort 
is made to express new concepts by coining ‘native’ words from ‘native’ elements 
(Hutterer 1986: 138–139). These new coinages most often take the form of relatively 
transparent compounds, e.g. sjónvarp ‘television’, composed from sjón ‘vision, 
sight’ and varp ‘projection’ (from the verb verpa ‘to throw’, cf. German werfen) or 
the extension of the meaning of already existing words. The way in which these 
meaning extensions are brought about seem to be in accordance with the previously 
described analogous copying function of cognition and the tendency to build on 
perceived contiguities and similarities, for instance in the case of sími ‘telephone’, 
which comes from a now obsolete word, síma meaning ‘cord, thread’, and the 
connection between ‘cord’ and ‘telephone’ is quite apparent. Perhaps the reason 
why these newly introduced words are accepted and integrated into the language 
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rather easily is because their new, assigned meanings conform to the rules of 
vocabulary expansion and to the general tendencies of human cognition. It should 
also be noted that such conscious intervention and introduction of newly coined 
words may result in the emergence of novel conceptualizations and new conceptual 
metaphors. Furthermore, a plethora of neologisms are coined every day by speakers 
all over the world, the overwhelming majority of which do not even make it into 
usage by a wider circle of more than a few people, let alone to lexicalization.
Turning our attention to Hungarian, but still staying for a little while with the 
topic of conscious innovation, the work of the Hungarian neologists from between 
the late 18th and the middle of the 19th century should be mentioned. The main 
motivation behind this ‘intervention’ was that Ferenc Kölcsey and the other 
innovators felt that Hungarian was lagging behind other European languages in 
its capability to express new notions, and felt the need to update the language. The 
neologists sometimes resorted to the introduction of the loan translation of foreign 
terminology (most commonly German), but the vast majority of the innovations 
were carried out by the native morpheme inventory of the language, and were of a 
lexical nature, which very often required the reintroduction or reinterpretation of 
obsolete words. The other frequently used technique of linguistic innovation was 
the reintroduction of obsolete derivative suffixes that were often attached to newly 
formed words, which were formed through employing the methods of clipping 
and back-derivation. The bottom line and the outcome of the entire neologist 
agenda was that thousands of new words were coined, many of which are still 
frequently used in present-day Hungarian. Their success, similarly to the success 
of the Icelandic neologisms, is perhaps attributable to their naturalness (at least the 
naturalness of those that have survived and became an integral part of everyday 
discourse and language use) and to the fact that they were mostly built on analogy. 
Among the currently observable ongoing changes in Hungarian, the case of the 
verbal prefix be- ‘in’ is a noteworthy example to be brought to mind (cf. Balázs 2010: 
169; Szili 2005a, 2005b). Verbal prefixes in Hungarian originally conveyed – and still 
convey in present-day Hungarian – spatial relations and spatial movements, such as 
kivisz ‘take out’, elmegy ‘go away’, összehoz ‘bring together’, etc. However, in recent 
times, the be- prefix has undergone a rapid expansion of meaning, very often at the 
expense of other prefixes. These new meanings include meanings of inward motion, 
meanings of totality (e.g. beerdősödik ‘becomes completely forested’), and meanings of 
saturation and completed actions (e.g. bedrogozik ‘drug up’) (Balázs 2010). 
Finally, as a side note, the role of translations – and especially low quality, 
quasi-correct translations – should be mentioned. Through employing syntactic 
and morphological structures in the target language which are calqued from 
the source language and reflect those syntactic and morphological structures of 
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the source language which are not found in the target language, the translation 
may – inadvertently – introduce new meanings, new ways of expressing oneself and 
new ways of conceptualization, all of which may appear foreign and unnatural to 
speakers of the target language.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the cognitive aspects of semantic 
change, and the ways in which context and contextualization facilitate the 
emergence of new meanings. It has been shown that semantic change relies on 
basic cognitive processes and mechanisms, which are analogy, categorization, 
embodiment, metaphor, metonymy and conceptual metaphor. Furthermore, it has 
also been pointed out that new meanings can only come about in a context, which 
might be linguistic or cultural. 
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